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Abstract 
In this  paper we  provide empirical evidence that Antidumping (AD) Protection can induce 
technological catching-up by domestic firms affected by the import protection. We identify a 
panel of 1,793 import-competing domestic firms between 1993 and 2000, directly affected by 
AD  cases  that were  initiated in  1996.  Using  a  difference-in-difference  approach,  we  find 
evidence  of increased Total Factor Productivity  (TFP)  growth  for  firms  protected by  AD 
measures compared to firms that did not receive protection. However, our analysis indicates 
that the  effect of protection depends  on  the  "distance to  the  frontier firm"  in the  industry. 
While protection raises TFP growth of "laggard" firms, the reverse holds for domestic firms 
that  are  close  to  the  efficiency  frontier.  These  results  confirm  recent  theoretical  work 
supporting the view that protection can induce technological catching-up. 
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1 Antidumping Protection and Productivity Growth of Domestic Firms 
I.  Introduction 
From an economic point of view, there seems to be a growing consensus that in many 
cases Antidumping policy (AD)  is  an  industrial policy tool  in  disguise.  Rather than being 
targeted  at  keeping  'unfair imports'  out  to  safeguard  future  welfare,  it  is  often  aimed  at 
fostering the interests of domestic producers (Lawrence,  1998), irrespective of the intent of 
importers  I. However, in view of the industrial policy nature of AD measures, it is surprising 
that  so  little  empirical  work  exists  on  measuring  the  effects  of AD  policy  on  domestic 
producers2.  Most  empirical  work  so  far  has  focused  on  the  trade  and political  economy 
aspects of AD protection and on the impact on foreign producers3. In contrast, the focus of 
this  paper is  on the  effects of AD  protection on the performance of domestic  firms  in the 
importing country that compete with the foreign product. In particular, we look at the effects 
of  AD protection on domestic firms' total factor productivity growth. 
A  priori,  the  relationship  between  protection  and  productivity  growth  is  not  an 
unambiguous one.  On the basis of the  Schumpeterian idea that a relaxation of competition 
raises  firms'  incentives  to  invest  in  cost reducing technology,  we  would expect to  find  a 
positive relationship between trade protection and productivity growth. Rodrik (1992) points 
out  that  if protection  induces  a  higher  effective  market  size,  a  technologically  backward 
producer will invest in catching-up. However, when oligopolistic interactions are considered 
in the home market and firms can commit to cost reducing investments before product market 
competition takes  place,  incentives can go  either way,  depending on the  mode of strategic 
conduct. Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995,1999), use a dynamic model to show that irrespective of 
the mode of strategic conduct, temporary tariff protection can speed up the adoption of cost 
reducing new technology by the protected domestic firms, provided there exists an exogenous 
ending date of protection4.  However, this result may be reversed when firms interact in more 
than one  market.  In particular,  Gao  and Miyagiwa  (2003)  show  in  a  reciprocal  dumping 
I  Shin (1998) provides evidence that less than 10% of AD cases are about predatory intent, arguably 
the only economic rationale for protecting against dumped imports. 
2 A small number of papers have looked at the effects of trade policy on abnormal returns of domestic 
US producers using stock market data (e.g. Lenway et al.,  1990; Hartigan et al.,  1989 and Blonigen et 
al., 2002).  These studies all identify potential excess returns from import relief. 
3 Empirically, a large range of trade aspects of  AD have already been well documented like the inward 
FDI effects (Blonigen, 2002), trade restrictiveness  (Staiger and Wolak, 1994; Prusa, 1997, Konings et 
al.  1999), retaliation aspects (Blonigen and Bown, 2003), pass-through effects (Blonigen and Haynes, 
2002) and others. Also, the political economy aspects of  AD have formed the subject of  many studies 
including Finger et al. (1982), Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994), Moore (1992) and Hansen and Prusa 
(1997). 
4 When the ending date of  protection is endogenous, i.e. if it depends on when firms adopt the new 
technology, protection delays adoption. Everaert (2004) extends their model to the case of  AD price 
undertakings in the European AD context. 
2 model  that  when  both  the  home  and  the  foreign  firm  compete  in  each  others'  markets 
incentives  to  invest  in  cost  reducing  technology  are  reduced  when  a  single  government 
imposes AD actions. Finally, Crowley (2002) shows in a multi-country setting that country-
specific AD duties induce both import-competing and non-dumping foreign exporting firms 
to adopt new technology earlier compared to free trade, however, when duties are worldwide, 
like a safeguard tariff only the import-competing firms accelerate technology adoption. 
In Section II, we extend the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) framework to bring out two 
additional results that were not explicitly treated in their paper, but that will prove useful in 
further  motivating  and  understanding  our  empirical  results.  One  is  that  we  show  that  the 
productivity effects of a duty  are  stronger for  'laggard' home  firms,  compared to  efficient 
home firms that operate closer to the technology frontier. Another result is to show that when 
we  allow for  differentiated products,  it becomes clear that the  effect of duty protection on 
restructuring5  is  stronger  in  industries  with  homogeneous  goods  compared  to  those  with 
differentiated products. Firms that file  for AD-protection are typically selling a good that is 
relatively homogeneous compared to the imported foreign product, since by law, the foreign 
product has to be a 'like product' of the domestically produced product for an AD-case to be 
eligible. It is  exactly in this case that the theoretical framework suggests that the impact of a 
duty on productivity growth can be expected to be strongest. 
To empirically test for changes in productivity growth as  a result of AD  protection, 
we will use the  1996 European AD cases and the domestic producers affected by them. We 
identify 1,793 EU firms directly affected by the AD policy and use their corresponding firm 
level company accounts data to  obtain output and input measures between 1993 and 2000 to 
estimate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth before and after AD protection. We estimate 
TFP  growth using the approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) to  correct for  sample 
selection and the endogeneity of input factors. Our empirical analysis consists of  two steps. In 
step  1, we estimate TFP for the firms involved in AD-cases. This will be done on a product-
by-product basis. In a second step we use a difference-in-difference approach to evaluate the 
effect of AD-protection  on firm  level  TFP  growth.  We use  several  control  groups  in  the 
difference-in  difference  approach.  One  consisting  of all  AD  cases  that  did  not  receive 
protection and another where we randomly draw a control group of 1,002 firms  in industries 
similar to the AD industries but not involved in AD cases. Our results clearly indicate that the 
average  productivity  growth  of  domestic  firms  after  protection  (1997-2000)  goes  up 
compared to  the free  trade period (1993-1996)  before protection and  compared to  the  two 
control groups that we use. 
5 We use the word restructuring to refer to firms engaging in cost reducing investment, broadly defined 
and interpreted. 
3 While  we  study  the  effects  of trade  protection  on productivity  growth of finns,  there 
exists  a  literature  that  has  analyzed  the  effects  of trade  liberalization  on  finn  level  TFP. 
Levinsohn  (1993),  Harrison  (1994)  and  Tybout and Westbrook (1995)  and  more  recently 
Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, all point in the direction that trade liberalization raises productivity 
of domestic  finns  in  developing countries.  These  studies  consider finns  that belong to  the 
manufacturing sector as  a whole, including import competing and export oriented firms  and 
are therefore more general equilibrium in nature than our study. Their results can be regarded 
as  the  outcome of a macro-economic trade  liberalization policy where  productivity growth 
can  come  from  the  exit  of less  productive  firms  and  a  reallocation  of resources  across 
different sectors.  Our analysis in this paper is  much more partial equilibrium. We will only 
consider the productivity effects of trade protection on import-competing finns producing a 
very  close  substitute  to  the  imported  product.  Thus  our  purpose  is  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness  of AD  policy  for  the  domestic  firms  it  is  designed to  foster,  rather than  to 
evaluate  its  overall  welfare  effects  or  desirability.  While  our  results  indicate  that  AD-
protection enhances the productivity growth of protected firms, it may well be that the overall 
effect of AD-protection is to slow down the productivity growth of the economy as  a whole. 
AD-protection may well prevent allocative efficiency to take place in the sense that resources 
of finns that would be freed up under free trade and reallocated to more productive sectors in 
the economy, instead stay in place in the  import-competing sector which is  likely to  lower 
overall welfare6.  However, our results do suggest that a policy of trade protection can induce 
technological catching-up and alter the growth path of  the firms affected by the policy. 
II.  Theoretical Framework 
In this section we  present a simple model which motivates our empirical work. We use 
the model by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) to  show that temporary tariff protection with an 
exogenous ending date results in earlier adoption of new technology compared to free trade7. 
This  implies  that  protected  finns  have  an  incentive  to  restructure  and  will  lower  their 
marginal costs faster under protection than under free trade. The adoption of new technology 
is modelled as a reduction in marginal cost which corresponds with an increase in TFP. In this 
paper we bring out two new results that were not explicitly treated by Miyagiwa and Ohno 
(1995).  First, we show that the effect of protection on the  implementation of cost reducing 
new  technology  depends  on  the  efficiency  level  of the  protected  home  firms.  We  find 
protection to  have  more  of an  effect  on  less  efficient home  firms,  in  other words,  while 
protection speeds up the adoption of new technology by 'laggard' home firms, this is far less 
6 Gallaway et al. (1999) have estimated the welfare cost of US AD and CVD law at $4 billion a year. 
7 Antidumping Protection in the EU lasts for 5 years (,Sunset Clause'). 
4 the case for home firms that already operate closer to  the technology frontier.  Our empirical 
results will confirm that there is firm heterogeneity in the effects of duty protection. Second, 
we  also  introduce product  differentiation into  the  model and  show that  a  duty  sorts  more 
effect when products are homogeneous than when products are  differentiated.  This  implies 
that AD-cases are a very good area to  look for potential increased productivity as  a result of 
protection, since by law, import-competing products have to be close substitutes to the foreign 
imported products, for an AD-investigation to start. 
We first start by deriving the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) result. Consider a model with 
two firms,  a home (H)  and a foreign firm (F),  competing for output in the home market in 
every period t with tE [0,+00[. The foreign firm is the most technologically advanced and has 
a  marginal  cost  cg .  The  home  firm  is  a  technological  laggard  and  operates  at  a  higher 
marginal cost of production  Co  where  co> C fi' Demand in the domestic market for  each of 
the firms is given by 
with i,j  = H,F  and i :;t.  j  (1) 
where we normalize market size to  1 and parameter b is the extent of product differentiation 
between the home and the foreign product and  0< b  ::::;  1.  By assumption the marginal costs 
are lower than the market size 1>  co> C fi . 
A cost reducing technology is available and can be adopted at a fixed cost k(t), which 
falls  over time  at a decreasing rate k'(t)<O  and k"(t»O.  This makes  the  adoption  cost a 
negatively sloped convex function over time which is  shown in Figure 1. We further assume 
that by t=O,  the  firm  in  the foreign country has  adopted this new technology and enjoys a 
lower  marginal  cost  of production  cg .  The  home  firm  still  uses  an  old  technology  and 
operates at a higher cost of production co' The home firm compares the cost of adopting this 
new technology with the  gains of technology adoption in  each period.  However,  there  is  a 
trade-off,  since postponing the  technology adoption makes  its  adoption less  costly.  So  the 
home firm balances the gains from early adoption against higher costs of early adoption and 
chooses the timing accordingly. Given that protection affects profits, the profitability of early 
technology adoption might be altered and hence the timing may change as  compared to free 
trade. This comparison was the central concern in the analysis of  Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995). 
Before the new technology is adopted, the home firm's profits under free trade (FT) are given 
by 
5 (2) 
At the time of adoption of new technology t*, a one time fixed cost k(t*) is incurred, which 
implies that for t >t*, period t home profits equal 
(3) 
While the foreign profits at any time during free trade (FT) are 
(4) 
Without loss of  generality we set cf!. =0 and simplify notation now by writing ce as c >0. 
It is easy to show that lower marginal production cost of  the foreign firm will result in a lower 
equilibrium price for that firm compared to  the home filTfl,  which allows the home finn to 
apply for  antidumping protection.8  When the home government installs an AD-duty  1:,  the 
foreign firm's profits after protection (D) become 
(5) 
IL 1. Free Trade 
A any t < t*, i.e. before the adoption date,under free trade the outcome of  the Cournot game is 
characterized by the solution to the following problem 
Equilibrium profits at t < t* are as follows 




6 IIHFT- = (2-b-2e)2 
,B  (4_b2 )2  (8) 
II  F  FT  = (2 - b + be) 2 
'Ii  (4_b2)2 
(9) 
The characterization of the equilibrium at t> t*  is  easy since the marginal costs of both firms 
in that case will be the same as both have adopted the new technology. The equilibrium is 
symmetric and equilibrium profits are equal to 
(10) 
Note that the home firm has an incentive to adopt the new technology since II  H  Ii  > II  He. 
The  optimal timing  of technology  adoption under the  case  of free  trade,  t*,  is  chosen by 
maximising the following inter-temporal profit function (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995) 
t*  +00 
~~x  'l' =  fe-rtIIH  FT,edt+  fe-rtII H FT,lidt-e-rt*k(t*) 
o  t*  (11) 
where r denotes a given interest rate.  The first and second integral represent the  discounted 
sum of profits before and after the adoption of new technology, respectively whereas the last 
term is the present discounted value of  the adoption cost. 
Miyagiwa and Ohno  (1995)  have  shown that the solution to  t*  is  given by the  following 
equilibrium condition 
rk(t) - k' (t) = II  H  FT,1i  - II  H  FT,e  (12) 
This expression equates the marginal cost to  the marginal benefit of technology adoption at 
time t.  The left hand side represents the  marginal benefit of waiting one period: the home 
firm benefits from investing the money k(t) in an alternative use and earns rk(t) and saves on 
the cost of technology adoption k'  (t) by waiting one more period. The right hand side of the 
equation gives the marginal benefit of adopting the new technology now. 
Graphically,  in  figure  1,  the  optimal  timing  of technology  adoption  t*,  is  found  at  the 
intersection of  benefits and costs. Note that the benefit of technology adoption is independent 
7 over  time.  To  see  whether  duties  change  the  timing  of technology  adoption  one  has  to 
compare the marginal benefit of technology adoption with and without protection. 
IL2.  Protection 
The temporary character of AD-protection lies in the fact that we assume that after a 
fixed period of protection T, free trade is back in place. Also we assume that the length of the 
protection period T, is longer than the date of  technology adoption under free trade t*. 
The equilibrium condition for  optimal timing of investment entails the marginal benefit of 
technology adoption by the home firm.  Therefore our focus  lies on the profits of the home 
firm. In the case of  duty protection, the home profits before technology adoption are given by 
(13) 
After technology adoption, home profits during protection are 
(14) 
The optimal timing for cost reducing investment under protection t"is  then derived from the 
following maximand, assuming that adoption occurs before the ending date of  the protection. 
I,  T  +00 
max 
I, 
'¥ =  Je-rlrrH  -dt+ Je-rIITH  dt+ J  -rlrrH  - -rl'k(t)  D,e  D,f!.  e  FT,f!.  e  r 
o  I,  T  (15) 
And is found at tT that satisfies 
rk(t) - k'  (t) = rr H D,f!.  - IT H D,e  (16) 
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995)  argue that duty protection speeds up the timing of technology 
adoption compared to  free trade  (tT  < t*),  by showing that the marginal benefit of adoption 
with protection has to be larger than the one without protection, or: 
ITH  rrH  - >  rrH  rrH- D,f!.  - D,e  FT,e  - FT,e 
(17) 
8 In other words, Miyagiwa and Ohno have shown that a tariff raises the marginal benefit of 
technology adoption. Or, that the derivative of the marginal benefit of technology adoption is 
an increasing function of  the duty 
ocrrH D.£!.  - rrH D.e) 
OT 
4bc 
>  0  (18) 
The finding that trade protection by the home country results in higher productivity 
growth of the home firm,  at the expense of productivity growth of the foreign firm abroad, 
corresponds with the  recent findings  of Melitz and Ottaviano (2003).  Using a monopolistic 
competition model and allowing for entry and exit of firms, they look amongst others at the 
effects of increased product market competition on firm  level  efficiency.  They find  that a 
country that liberalizes its trade, results in a deterioration of domestic firm productivity while 
the foreign firms experiences productivity improvement. While their model holds many more 
results  than  the  one  reported here,  we  just focus  on the  notion that  corresponds  with the 
theoretical  framework used here which points out that trade protection on foreign  imports 
raises the incentives of  domestic firms to invest in productivity growth. 
A result that is not made explicit by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) but present in their 
model is that a tariff on imports has different effects depending on the efficiency level of the 
home firm. This can be seen by taking the cross-derivative with respect to the home marginal 
cost of production. It can be verified that this derivative is  positive, implying that the more 
inefficient the home firm, the more an AD duty speeds up the adoption of new technology. Or 
in other words, AD protection sorts more of an effect for  'laggard' home firms  compared to 
home firms that operate at an efficiency level closer to the technology frontier. 
~cocrrH  D,£!.  _rrH  D,e)) =  4b  >  0 
OC  OT  C4-b2)2 
(19) 
This  finding  is  also  related to  the  work of Acemoglu et  al.  (2003).  Using  an  endogenous 
growth  model  they  argue  that  more  'backward'  economies  may  benefit  from  a  limit  on 
product market competition in  order to  move  closer to  the  world technology frontier.  The 
reason is  that anti-competitive policies will increase the productivity gains that the  firms  in 
these countries can appropriate from their initial investment costs.  However, they also point 
out that  when the  'distance to  the  frontier'  is  small,  continuing to  use  import  competing 
protection, may result in a non-convergence trap, where a country/firm will never be able to 
catch  up  with the  foreign  frontier  countries/firms.  Also,  Boone  (2000)  and  Aghion  et  al. 
9 (2002) argue that a firm's response to competition, depends on its efficiency level. Aghion et 
al.  (2002)  show  both  theoretically  and  empirically  that  competition  may  increase  the 
incremental profit from innovating, but for laggards more competition may reduce innovation 
incentives. 
A  second  extension  that  we  highlight  here  is  related  to  the  degree  of product 
differentiation  in  the  market.  Miyagiwa  and  Ohno  (1995)  developed  their  model  under 
homogeneous  Cournot,  while here we  introduce  differentiated products.  This  allows  us  to 
raise another interesting question, namely whether the effect of an AD-duty depends on the 
degree of product differentiation between the home and the foreign product. This can be seen 
by  taking  the  cross-derivative  with  respect  to  the  parameter  of product  differentiation  b, 
which turns out to be positive. This suggests that as products become more homogeneous and 
b gets closer to 1, the effect of  AD protection speeds up technology adoption more. 
~(a(IIH  D,~ _IIH  D,e)) = 4c(4+3b2)  >  0 
ab  aT  (4_b2)3 
(20) 
In what follows it is not our intention to structurally test the above framework, rather it is 
a  useful  guideline  for  interpreting  our  empirical  evaluation  of AD  protection  on  firm 
behavior. Because we have no information on the timing of adoption of new technology and 
the type of technology, we interpret technology adoption in the above framework as  general 
efforts of firms to engage in efficiency enhancing restructuring. It is  also for this reason that 
we will focus on firm level productivity growth, which is regarded as a reasonable proxy for 
technical change (Keller, 2004). 
III.  The Data 
An important innovation of our work is  that we will use firm level data to  test for the 
relationship between AD-protection and productivity growth of the protected firms.  An AD-
case  typically  involves  an  investigation  against  product  level  imports  from  exporting 
countries that are accused of dumping by the import-competing ED industry.  The dumping 
complaint  is  investigated  by  the  ED  Commission  and  can  result  in  'Protection'  or  in 
'Termination'.  If protection  is  decided upon,  an  AD  duty  on  imports  is  installed  on  the 
'dumped' product and benefits all ED import competing producers of the same product. If the 
Commission decides to  'terminate' the case, the dumping complaint is  rejected and the EU 
producers do not get import relief. For the purpose of  analyzing the relationship between AD-
protection and productivity growth of EU producers, we identify EU firms that are competing 
with the  dumped product in the EU market.  We obtained their company accounts  from  a 
10 commercial database sold under the name of  AMADEUS9 that runs from 1993-2000. This is a 
pan-European set of company accounts with harmonized entries for all European enterprises. 
In view of the time dimension of this data, we focused on the AD-cases initiated and brought 
to  the European Commission for  investigation in 1996.  This allows us to  have a number of 
annual observations before and after the initiation of  an AD-case. This is a useful property for 
the empirical methodology when we tum to a difference-in-difference approach to  study the 
differential effects of AD-protection on TFP-growth, by making the  pre-treatment period to 
be about equally long as the post-treatment period. Protection, if  decided upon, starts one year 
after the initiation of an AD case, i.e. the years 1997-2000. To identify the EU firms affected 
by  the  1996  AD-cases,  we  use  the  information  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of the 
European Commission. In 1996, 26 newlO AD Investigations and 3 expiry reviewll cases were 
initiated,  representing  13  different products or product groups.  A product is  very narrowly 
defined at the 8 digit HS-product classification. Examples are  'Luggage and Travel Goods', 
'Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes' and 'Cotton Fabrics'. The novelty of our data lies exactly in 
'matching'  these  8 digit products mentioned in the AD-case,  with the EU  firms  producing 
these products12. However, not all cases offer a sufficient number of observations to carry out 
a sensible  empirical analysis,  so  we  only focus  on those  cases  for  which we  could find  a 
reasonable number of  firm level data 13. 
In Table 1 we list the 8 product groups for which we were able to retrieve all the variables 
from the unconsolidated company accounts, required for our analysis, together with summary 
statistics  of the  most  important  variables  required  in  the  first  stage  of the  analysis  for 
estimating  TFP  per  import-competing  product  group.  In  4  cases  (by  product  group),  the 
outcome  was  protection  in  the  form  of an  AD-duty,  while  in  4  other  cases,  the  EU 
Commission did not grant import relief, after which the case was terminated. In total, these 
cases represent 1,793 EU import competing firms for which we could retrieve all the required 
variables to  carry out our analysis.  Of these,  890 EU firms  benefited from AD-protection, 
9 AMADEUS is a commercial dataset that can usefully be compared to COMPUSTAT data in the US, 
but in addition to the large and listed firms, our version of  AMADEUS also includes small and medium 
sized enterprises. The AMADEUS data set has increasingly been used in other academic work. Recent 
examples  include Budd,  Konings  and  Slaughter (2004),  Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004)  and Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 
10  The  initiation  of  a  case  concerning  several  countries  is  accounted  as  separate 
investigations/proceedings per country involved. We considered only those cases for which products 
were not subject to AD-protection in the years before. 
11  An 'expiry review' represents a case where protection is in place before 1996 but the EU domestic 
industry files for new protection because aledged dumping and injury are still carrying on. 
12 In the data appendix we give more details on how this 'matching' was exactly carried out. 
13  For a number of cases we could not identify the firms  that were producing the  AD  product under 
investigation. For some cases, no  initiating firms  were mentioned and/or the product description was 
very specific, which made it impossible or difficult to  trace firms producing such products in the firm 
level data base.  For instance, for  the case "Dihydrostreptomycin" no  initiating firms  were mentioned 
and the product was too specific to be able to trace finns in Amadeus producing this product. 
11 while 903  firms  did not.  Trade weighted duties range between 0 and 24%, with an average 
duty of 16%. 
In the second column of Table 1 we show the total number of firm-year observations 
for each case. For clarification, we point out that when the EU Commission decides to impose 
a  duty,  it  applies  to  all  EU-member  states  and  can  be  compared  to  a  'common  tariff 
protecting  the  EU  market  of identical  products  as  a  whole  against  the  named  dumping 
countries. Antidumping protection remains  in  place for  five  consecutive years,  after which 
AD-measures come offl4. 
A number of further remarks are in order here.  First, we believe 1996 to  be a very 
average  type  of year  in  terms  of AD-filings.  The number of new  initiations  in  1996  lies 
slightly below the average number of annual initiations of 32 in the period 1992-2000, to our 
knowledge there was neither a sector bias in terms of the type of product under investigation, 
nor a country bias in terms of  the defending countries involved in the year 1996. Therefore we 
would  expect  to  find  the  same  results  when  applying  our  analysis  to  AD-initiations  in 
different years.  Second, the company accounts data provide all the necessary information to 
estimate  production  function  coefficients  and  to  apply  an  Olley  and  Pakes  correction. 
However, one important drawback of using company accounts is  the  absence of firm level 
sales  prices  which would  be  useful  to  deflate  the  firm  level  value  added  figure  to  get  a 
measure for output. Instead many studies on productivity have used industry wide deflators, 
which is fine as long as the evolution of  firm level prices is in line with average industry price 
levels. However, when there are reasons to believe that firm level prices have risen more than 
industry prices,  the use  of industry wide deflators  can result in  an  overestimation of TFP 
levels as recently shown by Katayama et al (2003). This critique would definitely apply on 
our empirical analysis, since there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to  believe that 
AD-protection can result in increased sales prices of the domestic firms  involved (Konings 
and  Vandenbussche  2003;  Prusa,  1994).  Therefore,  as  an  altemative  to  using  industry 
deflators, we looked for a deflator that much more closely would reflect any possible increase 
in prices resulting from AD-protection. While firm level prices were not at our disposal, the 
price of goods traded on the EU market were readily available.  The  idea being that if AD-
protection  would  induce  higher  prices  for  their  products  on  the  European  market  after 
protection,  this  would  show  up  in  the  unit  values  of intra-European  trade  flows  of the 
products protected by a 'common' AD-duty. These unit values were retrieved over the same 
time period as  our company accounts  data.  By deflating our output measure with the  unit 
14  For one of the  1996 AD-cases in our sample an  'expiry review" investigation was initiated in 2002 
(seamless steel pipes and tubes). 
12 values, we avoid that an observed increase in TFP is driven by increased prices1S• In addition 
to  an aggregate producer price industry deflator and unit values of intra-EU exports, we also 
experimented with other deflators. In particular, instead of using unit intra-EU export values 
we used unit intra-EU import values. In all these cases our results remained robust. 
Apart  from  the  firm  data  that  correspond  to  the  AD  cases  we  also  retrieved  an 
additional control group of firms,  which we use  as  an exogenous counterfactual to evaluate 
whether any effect that we pick up after 1997 and attribute to AD protection is not spurious. 
We  constructed  a  counterfactual  group  of firms  by  the  random  sampling  of EU  firms, 
constraining the  sampling to  6  sectors,  different from  the  ones  already in  our data.  In the 
sampling of this counterfactual group we controlled for two aspects. First, in order to have a 
sufficient number of observations in  each product group, we  sampled sectors  at the 4-digit 
NACE  16 level and second, we wanted to obtain sectors that were comparable to AD-sectors in 
terms of their 'openness'. The reason is  that sectors with AD-filings are typically very open 
sectors in terms of their share  in extra-EU imports,  which is  a general property of sectors 
filing  for  AD  protection.17  Therefore we ranked the 235  NACE 4-digit sectors according to 
openness in  terms  of extra-EU import shares  in the year 1996,  we constrained the random 
sampling of firms for our control group in the top 25  % of these sectors, clustered around 6 
different product groups, but excluding those sectors that had been subject to  AD filings  in 
the past. This resulted in a random control group of 1,002 firms.  The sectors these firms are 
operating in are  listed in Table  3  and  include products  like  'Manufacture of Plastics'  and 
'Copper Production'. 
IV.  Empirical Methodology and Results 
IV.I. Estimating TFP 
The first  step  in the  empirical methodology consists of estimating TFP  using our firm 
level data for  each product group. Let us  describe firm i's technology at time t by a Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
(21) 
15  We  construct  our  deflator  by  dividing  the  product  level  intra-EU  export  values  by  their 
corresponding product level intra-EU export volume in each year and then nonnalized the index to 1 in 
1993.  The export values exclude costs of freight  and insurance and are  less  subject to  measurement 
error due to misreporting or underreporting for tax purposes as recently suggested by Fisman and Wei 
(2004). 
16 NACE is the official EUROSTAT industry classification. 
17 For example, for EU AD-cases from 1984-2000, there is a strong positive correlation between 4-digit 
NACE extra-EU import shares and AD filings. 
13 where Yit,  denotes the log of real value added18, lit denotes the log oflabor and kit>  denotes the 
log of capital measured by fixed tangible assets. The residual term can be decomposed into a 
white noise component (llit)  and a time varying productivity shock (COit),  the latter known by 
the  firm,  but not by the  econometrician.  An OLS  estimation of the  above  equation would 
result in inconsistent estimates for the labor and capital coefficients. The reason is that labor 
is  a  variable  input factor  and thus  its  choice  can be  affected by the  current value  of the 
unobservable productivity shock COit.  In other words, labor is likely to be correlated positively 
with the error term. This results in an upward bias of  the labor coefficient under OLS. Capital 
is assumed to be a fixed factor of  production and is only affected by past values of  co. 
To control for this endogeneity bias an IV approach can be applied when estimating 
(21).  The IV General Methods of Moments estimator (GMM) introduced by Arellano  and 
Bond (1991) is  one that has often been used in applications using firm level panel data to 
estimate  production functions.  However,  this  estimator requires  a  large  number of cross-
section observations to obtain reliable estimators. Pooling all cases together for estimating the 
production  function  would  be  one  option,  but  has  the  disadvantage  that  technological 
differences  between  sectors  are  not  taken  into  account.  In  addition,  past  values  of the 
endogenous  variables  may  tum  out  to  be  inappropriate  instruments,  for  instance  in  the 
presence of serial correlation. Instead, we will use a semi-parametric estimation technique as 
introduced by Olley and Pakes (O-P)  (1996),  which allows  us  to  estimate the  production 
function  (21)  consistently for  each product group19.  This  approach is  based on firm  profit 
maximization behavior in a dynamic framework as  developed by Ericson and Pakes (1995). 
In the appendix we briefly describe the estimation methodology. 
An important caveat in estimating TFP is  the possibility of measurement error that may 
plague  our analysis.  In  particular,  for  the  labor  input  in  our production  function  we  use 
number of employees. Although number of hours worked would have been an input with less 
measurement error and would more truly reflect the actual use of labor input,  this  was not 
available to us.  In terms of capital, we used the book value of fixed tangible assets, but we 
have no information on capacity usage or periods of idle capacity. However a recent paper by 
18  We use a valued added production function as in Olley-Pakes, rather than a gross output function for 
a  number of reasons.  First,  by  using  a  value  added production  function  we  avoid  finding  a  good 
material inputs price deflator, which is difficult to  find as  we do not know from our data what type of 
materials are being used in the production process, we just know the total amount of materials that have 
been used.  Second, by not including material inputs as  a regressor we  avoid a potential endogeneity 
problem with material inputs as they are most likely highly correlated with a productivity shock. Third, 
depending  on the  specific  accounting  legislation in  the  different EU  countries  where  our  firms  are 
located,  the  reporting requirements regarding sales and material costs vary,  which results  in missing 
observations on sales and material costs  in  a number of firms.  However, value added is  reported in 
most firms and is hence used as our left hand side variable. 
19 This approach has been used in a number of  recent empirical trade papers, examples include Pavcnik 
(2002),  Keller and Yeaple (2003), Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004) amongs others. 
14 Van Biesebroek (2003) compares different methods for  estimating production functions  on 
data characterized by known measurement errors and finds that the semi-parametric methods, 
like  the  O-P  one  we  use  here,  is  least  sensitive  to  measurement  error  when  estimating 
productivity  growth.  In  fact,  Van  Biesebroek  (2003)  shows  that  the  correlation  between 
estimated and true productivity when using semi-parametric methods remained high, even in 
the case of measurement error. 
U sing the estimates of  the labor and capital coefficients we compute TFP of firm i at time 
t, denoted by ([Pit,  in a standard way or 
(22) 
In Table 2,  we report results of the  input coefficients based on two different estimation 
methods, OLS and O-P. As  expected, the OLS results in most cases over-estimate the labor 
coefficients and underestimate the capital coefficients20.  The O-P estimates in Table 2 stem 
from our basic specification, where we allowed for exit of firms  and included time dummies 
to control for aggregate shocks in  investment. However, we also experimented with various 
other specifications of the O-P algorithm. The exit we observe in our sample is  very limited 
and may reflect the fact that firms fall below the threshold of the inclusion criteria of the data 
set. Therefore, a first experiment was, instead of allowing for exits, to  set the probability of 
survival equal to  1.  This resulted in a smaller capital coefficient compared to the results in 
Table 2,  but had no effect on our final analysis. We also experimented with excluding time 
effects in the investment function and with different depreciation rates to compute investment, 
again our estimated TFP did not change very much and had no  effect on our final analysis. 
The labor coefficient obtained from O-P typically is  estimated lower than the  one obtained 
from  OLS  and the  capital  coefficient is  typically higher,  which makes  it  hard to  sign the 
potential bias in estimating TFP based on OLS.  We  find  a positive and high correlation of 
76% between TFP growth based on OLS estimates and on O-P estimates. In the last column 
of Table 2 we show average TFP growth for the various AD cases that we investigate. We can 
note that average TFP  growth over the  entire sample period varies between slightly below 
zero (cotton fabrics) to 10% (Polyester Fibre and Yams). We also estimated the OLS and O-P 
production function coefficients for our randomly selected control group which are reported 
in Table 3. 
In Figure 2, we pool all cases together and plot over time the average TFP for three types 
of firms:  the termination cases, the protection cases and the random counterfactual firms over 
20  In two cases the labor coefficient under OLS is estimated lower than under O-P. This may reflect a 
negative  correlation  between  the  productivity  shock  and  the  use  of labor,  rather  than  a  positive 
correlation, which is usually the case. 
15 time. It shows that the average TFP improves after protection sets in. This can be seen both in 
panel A of Figure 2, where we plot the TFP levels as well as in panel B, where we normalize 
the average TFP to 1 in 1993. Interestingly, from panel A, we note that the average TFP level 
is  higher in  termination cases than in protection cases,  which indicates that for  AD  cases 
which the EU commission terminated, the average efficiency level was higher.  We also note 
that after 1996 when protection sets in, average TFP in the protection cases increases more 
strongly  than  in  the  termination cases.  In panel  B  it  becomes  clear  that  after  1996,  TFP 
growth  increased  more  in  the  protection  cases  compared  to  the  termination  cases  and 
compared to the random counterfactual. 
In Table 4 we show how aggregate industry (product level) TFP has evolved and whether 
its pattem is mainly driven by within firm improvements in TFP or mainly by a reallocation 
of market share  from  less  efficient to  more  efficient  firms.  We follow  the  decomposition 
introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996), where industry productivity is  a weighted average of 
firm level productivity, with shares of industry output as weights or, 
N 
TFPt = L  SittfPit  (23) 
i=l 
where  TFPt  is  industry  productivity  at  time  t  that  is  a  weighted  average  of firm  level 
productivities, tfpit is firm level productivity and Sit  is  firm i's share of output at time t.  This 
index can be decomposed in two terms as follows 
N  N 
TFPt = L(;  + f..sit)(tfPt + J),(/jJit) = tfpt + Lf..sitJ),tfPit  (24) 
i=l  i=l 
with 
f..sit =  Sit - S, 
J),tfPit = tfPit - (/jJ, 
and tfpt  and St  represent unweighted average productivity and share, respectively. 
This decomposition allows us  to  disentangle the  industry productivity (TFPJ  improvement 
into within firm productivity improvements,  given by the unweighted average productivity 
tfpt  versus  the  productivity  improvement  resulting  from  reallocation  of market  shares, 
N 
captured by the  covariance term  Lf..sitJ),tfPit . In Table 4  we  show for  each AD case  all 
i=l 
three measures. In column 1 we show the aggregate industry productivity measure (TFPt), the 
second column shows the unweighted average of firm level productivity tfpt  and the  third 
16 column  shows  the  sample  covanance  between  productivity  and  output.  If industry  TFP 
growth is mainly driven by within firm productivity improvements, we would expect to see 
high  and  increasing  values  in  column  2  over  time.  While  in  the  opposite  case,  when 
productivity is mainly driven by reallocation, especially the values in column 3 would appear 
to be high and increasing. 
A first observation arising from Table 4 is that industry productivity (TFPf)  increases 
more over time in duty cases, than in termination cases. And secondly, Table 4 clearly shows 
that in all cases, the  aggregate increase in TFP is  driven by the increase in the unweighted 
average productivity and therefore by within firm productivity improvements, and only to a 
very small extent by the reallocation component. This suggests that protection mainly affects 
TFP through within firm level restructuring; rather than reallocation, which is consistent with 
the idea that it is firm level efforts to restructure in response to protection that is driving TFP. 
In the next section we will test more formally whether this pattern holds up. 
[V.2 Evaluating the Effects of  AD-Protection: A difJerence-in-difJerence approach 
Single Difference Equations 
As  a  first  step  in  the  analysis  we  start  by  reporting  the  results  of single  difference 
equations, where we consider changes in TFP growth of firms pre-and post 1997 by including 
a  time  dummy  (T97)  that  gets  a  value  of 1 for  observations  after  1997  and a value of 0 
otherwise. We also include the lagged level of TFP to control for mean reversal and potential 
serial correlation, although this is  less likely to  be a problem in our case since we use TFP 
growth rates as a dependent variable as opposed to productivity levels. 
(25) 
i1tfp if  stands for the growth rate in TFP in firm i at time t.  The coefficient U2  captures the 
average  change  in  productivity  after  1997  compared  to  the  average  of the  period  before 
protection. 
In Table  5 we report the  magnitude  and  significance  of the  coefficient  U2  for  the 
single  difference  equations for  the  termination cases,  the protection cases  and a  randomly 
selected  control  group.  For  each  single  difference  equation  we  report  two  specifications 
(below each other), one  in which we  do  not include lagged TFP  and one including lagged 
TFP.  The results can be summarized as  follows.  For the  termination cases we find a small 
positive effect on TFP growth after 1997, but for the protection cases the positive increase in 
TFP growth after 1997 is larger. The result for the protection cases holds both when we use a 
17 protection dummy after 1997 as when we replace the dummy by the trade weighted AD duty. 
For the randomly selected control group we find no  statistically significant increase in TFP 
growth after 1997. 
When we look at the  results for the individual cases  in  Table  6,  however, we  find 
some variation across individual AD cases. For the protection cases, listed in the bottom half 
of Table 6,  we find a strong positive effect of AD protection on TFP growth with average 
increases in productivity growth ranging from 13% points in the "Leather Handbags" case to 
3% points in the "Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes case". One potential explanation for these 
differences could be the extent to which market share for domestic producers increases after 
protection. From Figure 3a it becomes clear that in the "seamless steel tubes" case, while the 
imports from the named countries fell after protection by the EU, the imports from the non-
named countries increased strongly. This import diversion could imply that the loss of sales in 
the EU market of the dumping countries predominantly resulted in an increase in sales in the 
EU market for the non-dumping importing countries rather than for the domestic producers. 
Whereas in the case of "Leather Handbags", Figure 3b  shows that there was far  less import 
diversion  to  non-named  countries.  While  the  imports  of the  dumping  countries  also  fell 
substantially in this case, the benefit in terms of sales did clearly not go to other importing 
countries but most likely accrued to the domestic EU producers. The increase in market share 
for the  domestic  producers could have resulted in  a  larger incentive for  domestic  firms  to 
engage in restructuring than it was the case in "Seamless steel tubes". 
All  protection  cases  are  newly  initiated  cases,  apart  from  "Polyester  Fibres  and 
yams". This case was initiated in  1996 as  an 'expiry review', implying that protection was 
already in place before 1996 and that in 1997, it was decided by the Commission to  extend 
the protection for another 5 years. After that, the industry no longer applied for an extension 
of AD  protection.  What we  observe in Table 6 is  that during that last period of protection 
between 1997-2002, the "Polyester Fibres and Yams" EU producers engaged in restructuring 
thereby increasing their productivity growth by 13% points. 
In two of  the four termination cases "Cotton Fabrics" and "Video Tapes", listed in the 
top half of Table 6,  we find no  increase in average TFP growth after AD  protection. While 
"Cotton Fabrics" is a new case, "Video Tapes" is initiated in 1996 as an 'expiry review'. But 
in contrast to  the other expiry review case,  "Video Tapes" did not get an  extension of the 
protection period, and was terminated in  1997 without protection. For this termination case 
we do not find an increase in TFP growth after 1997.  In the two other newly initiated cases 
that were terminated, we do  find positive but smaller TFP growth after 1997.  The strongest 
effect is found in the termination case, "Luggage and Travel Goods". For this case, we find 
average TFP growth to  increase with 7%  points after protection. The  likely reason for  this 
18 'atypical'  tennination case  is  potential  contamination  in  the  data.  In  our  data  there  are  a 
number  of  EU  firms  that  produce  both  "Luggage  and  Travel  Goods"  and  "Leather 
Handbags". While the EU Commission did not impose duties on the imports of the  fonner 
products, it did impose AD-duties on "Leather Handbags" during the same period. Even after 
excluding the EU finns that appeared in both cases, however, we still find a positive effect 
after  1997  for  the  "Luggage  and  Travel  Goods",  although  the  point  estimate  of 7%  is 
estimated smaller than the point estimate of 13% for "Leather Handbags". Overall we can say 
that the TFP growth in tennination cases is usually lower than in protection cases. 
The  problem  with  a  single  difference  approach  is  that  we  cannot  exclude  the 
possibility that the increase in productivity growth after 1997 in the protection cases is driven 
by other forces than AD  protection. To identify the effects of AD-protection better we  next 
tum  to  a  difference-in-difference  approach  (DD).  This  type  of an  approach  consists  of 
comparing TFP growth of  the 'treated' group i.e. the firms that got AD protection, to a control 
group of finns. This control group is very similar to the  'treated' group of finns but did not 
get the treatment i.e.  AD  protection.  This  way we  can control for  all  other forces  that are 
common for  the  treatment group  and the  control group  that may affect TFP  growth,  apart 
from AD protection.  An increase in TFP growth of the treatment group on top  of the TFP 
growth in the control group properly disentangles the effect of AD protection on TFP growth. 
That is the essence of  the DD approach. 
Difference-in-DifJerence Equations 
In order to  apply the difference-in-difference approach,  the treatment should be a one-
time change in government policy. Applied to the issue of  the effect of  AD protection on TFP 
growth,  this approach suggests  that one can compare the TFP growth pattern among firms 
before and after AD  protection with the TFP growth pattern of a control group before and 
after the  protection period.  The effect of AD  protection is  then identified as  the  estimated 
difference in differences of TFP growth rates before and after the protection period between 
the two groups of firms.  We first use the Termination cases as  a control group.  This control 
group consists of firms that have also applied for protection but did not receive it. Afterwards 
we tum to a randomly selected control group of  European finns that were not involved in any 
AD-cases during the period of our analysis but that belonged to industries with a similar level 
of 'openness'  compared  to  the  industries  involved  in  the  AD  cases.  Starting  with  the 
termination cases as a control group, the DD approach can be summarized as follows: 
19 PROTECT is  a dummy that takes a value of 1 for the entire period, if a firm got protection 
after  1997.  The  PROTECT  dummy  captures  any  time-invariant  differences  between  the 
protection firms  and  the  termination  firms  and  hence  controls  for  the  fact  that  firms  that 
receive protection may have some unobserved specific characteristics. T97 is a dummy where 
both the firms in the control group as well as the firms that got AD-protection after 1997, get 
a value of 1 after 1997 and a value of zero before.  This dummy picks up any time effect on 
TFP  growth  that  is  common to  all  firms,  due  to  common business  cycle  effects  or other 
common macro shocks.  And finally the  term T97 _PROTECT is  a dummy equal to  1 after 
1997 for firms that got protection, which captures the essence of the difference-in-difference 
approach.  This  interaction  term  captures  the  differential  effect  that  AD-policy  has  on 
protected firms  versus firms  in  cases that were terminated after 1997.  Thus  ~  I  captures the 
additional difference in productivity growth after protection sets in. 
One of the potential problems with using a DD approach is the potential serial correlation. 
Bertrand et al  (2004)  have shown that  not controlling for  serial  correlation  may  result  in 
underestimation of standard errors or overestimation of t-statistics. They mainly question the 
significance  of t-statistics  around  2,  which  when  not  accounting  for  serial  correlation are 
likely to be false rejections of the null hypothesis of 'no treatment' effect. In our research set 
up  this  is  less likely to  be a problem for  three reasons.  First,  while productivity levels  are 
likely  to  be correlated  over time,  this  is  far  less  the  case  with productivity  growth rates. 
Second,  the  time  series  we  consider here  is  relatively  short.  Nevertheless,  we  control  for 
potential serial correlation in the  data by including lagged log of TFP.  And third,  all the t-
statistics we obtain for the 'treatment' effect well exceed 2. 
Another  assumption  that  has  to  be  taken  into  account  to  justify  the  use  of the  DD 
approach is the randomness of the intervention. If the focus of our work would be to explain 
imports,  clearly there would be a serious concern about the  endogeneity of AD  protection, 
however, the focus here is  to  explain firm level efficiency in which case the endogeneity of 
AD protection is  less obvious. Nevertheless we try to  deal with this concern in a number of 
ways. We experimented with a specification where we include the level of TFP in  1996, the 
year before  the  AD  protection sets  in.  This  variable  captures  productivity of firms  before 
protection that may affect the AD decision, as  an extra control variable. It will become clear 
below that including TFP in 1996 results in somewhat lower estimates of the treatment effect, 
but  the  effect  of AD  protection  on  TFP  growth  is  still  positive  and  remains  statistically 
significant. Another way to deal with this is by choosing as a counter-factual the Termination 
cases,  which  arguably  are  most  similar  in  terms  of characteristics  to  the  AD  cases  that 
received protection. As discussed below, we find that the estimated effects are lower when the 
20 Termination cases  are  used as  a  control group  compared to  a  Random control group,  but 
overall the results are still positive and statistically significant. 
In the first three columns of Table 7 we report the results of various DD specifications, 
using the termination cases  as  a  control group.  The  second column accounts  for potential 
serial correlation by including lagged TFP, while the third column includes the TFP level in 
1996 instead. The coefficient of interest is  the one on T97  _PROTECT, which captures the 
differential impact on TFP  growth after 1997  for  the  firms  receiving AD-protection.  In all 
three specifications the effect of protection after 1997 is  positive and statistically significant 
with estimates varying between 2.8 % to 6.4 % depending on the specification. We note that 
the coefficient on the T97 which is a dummy equal to  1 from the year 1997 onwards is always 
positive and significant. This captures common aggregate effects applying to both protection 
cases  and termination  cases.  The  significance  of this  dummy  indicates  that  not  only  the 
protection but also the termination cases have experienced an increase in TFP growth after 
1997. Therefore, in the regressions (1)  to  (3),  the interaction term T97  ]ROTECT captures 
the additional increase in TFP growth that the protection cases have experienced. 
An  alternative  way  to  check  the  effects  of the  intervention  is  instead  of using  the 
termination  cases  as  a  control  group,  to  use  a  random  counterfactual  control  group.  In 
selecting this control group we paid particular attention to selecting industries that are similar 
in  their  openness  to  imports,  compared  to  the  AD  industries.  The  results  of the  DD 
specifications using the random control group are shown in Table 7 columns (4)-(6). It can be 
noted from Table 7 that now, the common aggregate effect captured by T97 disappears and 
the  coefficients  on the  interaction term T97  _PROTECT becomes  larger,  compared to  the 
specifications where we used the terminations as a control group. The effect of AD protection 
on TFP growth now ranges between 7.2% and 8%. This implies that compared to the random 
counterfactual firms, the TFP growth of  the protected firms in AD cases increased more.  This 
may  suggest  that  in  fact  termination  cases  are  more  similar  to  the  cases  that  received 
protection and  it  could therefore  be  argued that this  is  the  more  proper control  group  to 
compare with. 
In the last three columns of Table 7,  we take both the termination cases and the random 
counterfactual as  a control group.  Hence,  we  now have three  'groups' of cases:  Protection 
cases,  Termination cases and Counterfactual cases.  This will allow us  also to  evaluate the 
effect on TFP  growth of 'Filing' in addition to the  effect for  'Protection'. We construct a 
dummy (FILING) equal to  1 either if a firm belongs to the group of  firms receiving protection 
or to firms that got a termination decision. Focusing on column (8) of Table 7 we note that 
our basic  AD-protection  effect  on  TFP  growth  after  1997  is  still  estimated  positive  and 
statistically significant with a coefficient on T97  _PROTECT of 5.4 %.  In addition, we also 
21 find a positive 'filing' effect on TFP growth of 2.8 %.  This suggests that the net effect of AD 
protection on firm level TFP growth is about 8 % (5.4 %+2.8 %), which is similar to what we 
found in columns (4) to (6). 
Our results seem to be robust with respect to using different counterfactual samples and 
with  respect  to  whether  or  not  we  include  lagged  TFP  or  productivity  levels  prior  to 
protection.  Given that we have  estimated TFP after taking  into  account variation in  input 
factors, the increase in TFP we pick up is unlikely to be explained by a scale effect, but seems 
rather  to  be  consistent  with  the  idea  that  firms  have  more  incentives  to  engage  in  cost 
reducing restructuring efforts once they receive temporary protection.  From our theoretical 
framework we  expect,  however,  that depending  on whether firms  are  laggards  or not the 
effects of protection are  different.  In  particular,  we characterize each firm  in terms  of its 
"distance to the frontier firm",  where we define  'frontier firm'  as the firm with the highest 
TFP level in a particular industry. In the theoretical section we have shown that the effect of 
protection  will  be  relatively  stronger,  the  larger  the  difference  in  efficiency  between the 
domestic firm and the foreign firm. Since we have no information on the efficiency levels of 
foreign firms we will take the most productive EU finn as our benchmark frontier firm in a 
particular sector21 .  Hence for each firm in our data we compute the distance to the frontier 
firm as the ratio of TFP of firm i,  in sector j  in 1996, relative to the firm with the maximum 
TFP level in sector j in 1996: 
DISTANCE  ..  =  tfp; 
IJ  maxtfpj 
(27) 
A  distance of 1 implies that a particular firm is  as  efficient as the frontier firm,  while a 
distance of 0 refers to a "laggard" with very low efficiency compared to the frontier firm.  In 
Table 8 we show the average distance for each of our three groups of finns and for each AD 
case in our sample. We find a pattern that is quite revealing. First we note that typically those 
firms involved in affirmative AD-cases are on average further away from the EU frontier firm 
than those that did not receive protection. The average distance of affirmative AD-cases is 
47%, while for termination cases this is 63%. In addition, the average distance to  the frontier 
firm in the termination cases is very similar to the average distance in the randomly selected 
control group. This suggests that the protection cases can typically be classified as "laggard" 
industries. When we look at the average distance level of  the individual cases we can note that 
within the termination cases "Cotton fabrics"  is  more comparable to  the  protection cases. 
Although we classify the case "Cotton fabrics" as  a termination case it is worth pointing out 
21  Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2002) develop empirically a similar idea to investigate productivity 
convergence between foreign and domestic UK establishments. 
22 that  during  the  investigation period  of the  EU  Commission  a  high  preliminary  duty  was 
imposed  on  importers.  The  only  reason  that  the  case  was  terminated  was  that  the 
'Commission had exceeded the  legal  period of investigation  and  had  not  reached  a final 
decision after 15 months since the initiation of a case'. 
In  Table  9  we  show  the  results  of our  DD  specification,  but  now  including  the 
'DISTANCE96,  variable  and the  interaction  of that  variable  with  our  previous  treatment 
variable T97  _PROTECT.  Including the DISTANCE96 measure is a relative measure of past 
productivity, that just like including the TFP level in  1996, as  we  did previously, is  also  an 
alternative  way  to  control  for  the  potential  endogeneity  of protection.  When  we  use 
termination cases  as  a control group,  which is  shown  in  column  (1)' of Table  9,  our basic 
result still holds. The coefficient of T97 _PROTECT is still positive and significant suggesting 
an average increase in TFP growth resulting from AD  protection.  In the  second column in 
Table  9,  we  interact  our  treatment  variable  T97 _PROTECT  with  the  distance  variable 
'DISTANCE96'.  We  find  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  effect  of this  interaction 
term.  This  indicates  that  the  further  a  firm  is  away  from  the  EU  frontier  firm  in  its 
corresponding sector, the stronger the impact of  protection, which is what we expected on the 
basis of our theoretical framework. For the frontier firm with a distance equal to '1' the effect 
of protection becomes  in  fact  negative  and  is  -17  %  (0.21-0.38=-0.17),  compared  to  the 
termination cases. These effects persist when we instead use our randomly selected group of 
firms,  which can be seen  from  columns (3)  and (4).  The  positive  effect of AD  protection 
reduces as firms are closer to the frontier. Based on the estimates of our last column in Table 
9, firms with an average distance to the frontier of  71  % or lower will benefit from protection, 
which holds for most firms in our data. 
v.  Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence that temporary AD  protection on average raises 
the productivity growth of domestic import-competing firms.  For this purpose we  identified 
around 2,000  European producers  affected by  AD  cases.  While  some  firms  were  granted 
protection, others were not.  Our results indicate that protected firms experienced higher TFP 
growth during the protection period, compared to  firms  that did not receive AD  protection. 
The  TFP  growth we measure is  one driven by  improved technical efficiency within firms, 
rather than by a reallocation of market shares towards more efficient firms.  We also find that 
the effect of  protection is subject to firm heterogeneity. Depending on the relative 'distance to 
the  frontier'  firm  in  the  industry,  AD  protection  can  either  increase  or  decrease  the 
productivity  growth  of the  domestic  firms.  While,  AD  protection  especially  raises  the 
productivity growth of 'laggard firms'  in the industry, this  is  far less the case for  domestic 
23 firms closer to the technology frontier. For these firms protection can even result in negative 
TFP growth.  These empirical results confirm recent theoretical findings that have pointed at 
the relationship between temporary tariff protection and domestic firms' incentives to become 
more efficient. 
It is worth pointing out that the analysis in this paper is not a general equilibrium one and 
it is therefore not possible to make welfare statements. In fact the overall welfare effects are 
likely to be negative since AD  protection prevents a process of allocative efficiency in  the 
importing country to take place. The results in this paper are therefore best interpreted as  an 
evaluation  of the  effectiveness  of AD  policy  on  domestic  firm  performance  and  on  the 
incentives it provides for technological catching-up. 
An interesting line of future research would be to do a similar analysis for the US.  One 
distinct feature between the EU and the US  implementation of the AD-code is  the length of 
AD-protection. While protection in the EU has always been limited to 5 years, it was not until 
the end of the Uruguay Round that the US adopted the 'Sunset Review' clause and limited the 
length of AD protection. Before that time, AD protection in the US  had a permanent nature. 
The question than becomes whether permanent AD protection has provided similar incentives 
for domestic US firms to engage in restructuring. 
Another  interesting  area  for  future  research  would be  to  consider  to  what  extent  the 
effects under AD duty protection are the same as under price-undertakings, which are a very 
popular  alternative  AD  measures  in  the  EU.  In  particular,  it  is  well  known  that  price-
undeliakings,  in  contrast  to  duties,  may  facilitate  price  collusion  which  could reduce  the 
incentive to restructure. 
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27 Table 1:  S  - --._-- -- .- ------_  .. - S  - - fk  .  bl  Antid  C 
AD-Case  Decision 
Cotton Fabrics  Termination 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes  Termination 
Luggage and Travel Goods  Termination 
Video Tapes*  Termination 
Leather Handbags  Duty 
Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes  Duty 
Polyester Fibre and Yams*  Duty 
Stainless Steel Fasteners  Duty 
Notes: standard deviations in brackets 
Emp: Average firm level employment in number of  workers; 
Cap: Average firm level Fixed Tangible Assets in thousands of  Euros 
Value Added: Reported value added in thousands of  Euros 
TFP growth: Average TFP growth in the product group 











Emp  Cap  Value 
(units)  (OOO€)  Added 
(OOO€) 
57  1804  2323 
(115)  (3835)  (4114) 
61  1551  2375 
(90)  (2986)  (4020) 
39  608  1446 
(56)  (1363)  (2245) 
371  12480  28266 
(724)  (24333)  (53517} 
33  585  2064 
(60)  (2632)  (21456) 
130  5387  6887 
(257)  (12413)  (14684) 
287  17402  17242 
(360)  (31961)  (24275) 
31  915  1477 
(37)  (1920)  (2200) 
28 Table 2: OLS and Olley-Pakes estimates of production function coefficients in AD-cases 
Coefficient on  Labor  Capital  Labor  Capital  Estimated 
OLS  OLS  O-P  O-P  TFP growth 
PI  Pk  PI  Pk 
Termination Cases 
Cotton Fabrics  0.68  0.20  0.66  0.23  -0.006 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.25) 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes  0.76  0.17  0.71  0.18  0.001 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.22) 
Luggage and Travel  0.82  0.19  0.81  0.19  0.018 
Goods  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.28) 
Video Tapes  0.37  0.38  0.43  0.25  0.05 
(0.08)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.33)  (0.42) 
Affirmative AD cases 
Leather Handbags  0.66  0.24  0.66  0.29  0.07 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.34) 
Seamless Pipes and  0.68  0.27  0.64  0.28  0.039 
Tubes  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.31 ) 
Polyester Fibres and  0.57  0.30  0.64  0.41  0.09 
Yarns  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.38) 
Stainless Steel Fasteners  0.87  0.17  0.79  0.23  0.06 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.26) 
Note:  Standard Errors in Brackets, the last column reports simple averages, with standard 
deviations in brackets. 
Table 3:  OLS and Olley-Pakes estimates of production coefficients for the  random 
control group 
Labor  Capital  Labor  Capital  Estimated 
OLS  OLS  O-P  O-P  TFP growth 
PI  Pk  PI  Pk 
Manufacture of metal  0.67  0.21  0.66  0.26  0.035 
structures  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.28) 
Inorganic basic  0.69  0.26  0.60  0.35  -0.04 
chemicals  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.19)  (0.20) 
Processing and  0.45  0.39  0.37  0.31  0.07 
Preserving of fruit  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
and vegetables 
Wine manufacturing  0.61  0.20  0.54  0.21  0.01 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.16) 
Plastics in primary  0.56  0.30  0.49  0.23  0.04 
form  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.18) 
Copper Production  0.71  0.25  0.67  0.25  0.017 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.19) 
Note: Standard Errors in Brackets, the last column reports simple averages, with standard 
deviations in brackets. 
29 Table 4: Olley-Pakes Productivity Decomposition 
Cotton Fabrics (Termination)  Handbags (Duty) 
Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N  Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N 
I~i,!1tfPit  I~it!1tfpit 
i=l  i=l 
1993  1  0.99  0.01  1993  1  0.99  0.01 
1994  0.98  0.97  0.01  1994  0.98  0.97  0.01 
1995  0.97  0.96  0.01  1995  1.00  0.98  0.02 
1996  0.95  0.94  0.01  1996  1.00  0.98  0.02 
1997  0.93  0.92  0.01  1997  0.98  0.97  0.01 
1998  0.95  0.94  0.01  1998  1.10  1.08  0.02 
1999  0.96  0.95  0.01  1999  1.17  1.16  0.01 
2000  0.98  0.97  0.01  2000  1.11  1.10  0.01 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes (Termination)  Seamless Pi pes and Tubes (Duty) 
Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N  Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N 
I~it!1tfpit  I~i,!1tfpit 
i=l  i=! 
1993  1  0.99  0.01  1993  1  0.98  0.02 
1994  0.99  0.98  0.01  1994  1.03  1.01  0.01 
1995  0.91  0.90  0.01  1995  1.05  1.03  0.02 
1996  0.93  0.92  0.01  1996  1.04  1.01  0.03 
1997  0.95  0.94  0.01  1997  1.06  1.04  0.02 
1998  0.98  0.97  0.01  1998  1.07  1.06  0.01 
1999  0.98  0.97  0.01  1999  1.09  1.08  0.01 
2000  0.97  0.96  0.01  2000  1.10  1.09  0.01 
Luggai!e and Travel Goods (Termination)  Polyester Fibres and Yarns (Duty) 
Year  TFPt  tfpt 
N  Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N 
I~it!1tfpit  I~it!1tfpit 
i=l  i=l 
1993  1  0.99  0.01  1993  1  0.99  0.01 
1994  1.05  1.04  0.01  1994  0.97  0.97  0.00 
1995  1.03  1.02  0.01  1995  0.98  0.97  0.01 
1996  1.00  0.99  0.01  1996  1.02  1.02  0.00 
1997  1.02  1.01  0.01  1997  1.03  1.02  0.01 
1998  1.03  1.02  0.01  1998  1.30  1.29  0.01 
1999  1.05  1.04  0.01  1999  1.20  1.18  0.02 
2000  1.11  1.10  0.01  2000  1.26  1.25  0.01 
Video Tapes (Termination)  Stainless Steel Fasteners (Duty) 
Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N  Year  TFPt  tfp, 
N 
I~i,!1tfPit  I~i,!1tfpit 
i=l  i=! 
1993  1  0.98  0.02  1993  1  0.99  0.01 
1994  1.06  1.04  0.02  1994  0.97  0.96  0.01 
1995  1.04  1.02  0.02  1995  0.90  0.89  0.01 
1996  1.06  1.04  0.02  1996  0.94  0.93  0.01 
1997  1.15  1.14  0.01  1997  0.99  0.98  0.01 
1998  1.07  1.05  0.02  1998  1.02  1.00  0.02 
1999  1.06  1.05  0.01  1999  1.07  1.07  0.00 
2000  1.02  0.99  0.03  2000  1.06  1.05  0.01 
30 Table 5:  Single Difference Equations for Pooled cases 
a 1  a2  # obs.  R2 
Termination Cases  - 0.03**  4571  0.01 
(0.007) 
Termination Cases  -0.21**  0.01 **  4571  0.12 
(0.01)  (0.006) 
Protection Cases  - 0.057**  4391  0.01 
(0.008) 
Protection Cases  -0.19**  0.08**  4391  0.10 
(0.02)  (0.009) 
Protection cases, using trade weighted  0.29**  4391  0.01  -
duties instead of time dummy T97  (0.04) 
Protection cases, using trade weighted  -0.19**  0.41 **  4391  0.10 
duties instead of time dummy T97  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Random control group  - -0.013  5461  0.01 
(0.007) 
Random control group  -0.18**  -0.001  5461  0.10 
(0.010)  (0.011) 
Notes: (i) Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets, (ii) ** refers to statistically 
significant different from zero at the 5% critical level or lower, (iii) all equations include 
country firm location fixed effects and case fixed effects. 
Table 6:  Single Difference Equations for Individual AD cases 
al  a2  R2 
Termination cases 
Cotton Fabrics  -0.20**  0.007  0.12 
(0.015)  (0.007) 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes  -0.22**  0.031 **  0.12 
(0.052)  (0.015) 
Luggage and Travel Goods  -0.28**  0.071 **  0.17 
(0.044)  (0.019) 
Video Tapes  -0.22**  -0.034  0.15 
(0.055)  (0.079) 
Protection cases 
Handbags  -0.17**  0.13**  0.10 
(0.038)  (0.016) 
Seamless Pipes and Tubes  -0.19**  0.03**  0.10 
(0.024)  (0.01) 
Polyester Fibres and Yams  -0.27**  0.13**  0.14 
(0.05)  (0.036) 
Stainless Steel Fasteners  -0.24**  0.12**  0.16 
(0.03)  (0.016) 
Notes: (1) HeteroskedastIc Robust standard errors In brackets, (ii) ** refers to statistIcally 
significant different from zero at the 5% critical level or lower, (iii) all equations include 
country firm location fixed effects. 
31 Table 7: Difference in Difference Estimates 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Control group =  Termination  Termination  Termination  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random 
cases  cases  Cases  Counter  Counter  Counter  counter  counter factual  counter 
Factual  Factual  Factual  factual and  and  factual and 
termination  termination  termination 
cases  cases  cases 
tfPit-l  - -0.16**  - - -0.11 **  - - -0.12**  -
(0.010)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
tfpil996  - -0.013**  -0.005  - -0.007* 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
T97  0.029**  0.017**  0.03**  -0.014**  -0.008  -0.014  -0.014**  -0.007  -0.014** 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
PROTECT  0.036**  -0.02**  0.03**  -0.002  -0.10**  -0.007  0.037**  -0.003  0.03** 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
FILING  - - - - - - -0.041 **  -0.104**  -0.045** 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
T97  PROTECT  0.028**  0.064**  0.028**  0.072**  0.081 **  0.072**  0.028**  0.054**  0.028** 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
T97  FILING  - - - - - - 0.044**  0.028**  0.043** 
(0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
R2  0.02  0.10  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.01 
# observations  8962  8962  8962  9852  9852  9852  14423  14423  14423 
Note: (i) **/* refer to respectively significance at the 5%/10% level, (ii) Heteroskedastic robust standard errors between brackets, (iii) All equations include 
firm location fixed effects. 
32 
I Table 8: Distance to the Frontier 
Distance 1996  Standard 
Deviation 
Termination cases  0.63  0.10 
Cotton Fabrics  0.61  0.09 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes  0.71  0.10 
Luggage and Travel Goods  0.66  0.10 
Video Tapes  0.79  0.11 
Protection cases  0.47  0.13 
Leather Handbags  0.34  0.07 
Seamless Pipes and Tubes  0.51  0.09 
Polyester Fibres and Yarns  0.54  0.13 
Stainless Steel Fasteners  0.64  0.08 
Random control group  0.63  0.13 
a  e  :  ectIveness 0  T  bl  9  En:  fAD  t  f  pro ec IOn an  IS  ance  0  e  ron ler  dD' t  t  th  f  f 
Termination  Termination  Random  Random 
Cases as  Cases as  control group  control group 
control group  control group 
DISTANCE96  -0.064**  0.08**  -0.06**  0.021 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
T97  0.028**  0.029**  -0.014**  -0.014** 
(0.011)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
PROTECT  0.026**  0.049**  -0.012*  0.000 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
T97  PROTECT  0.028**  0.21 **  0.072**  0.23** 
(0.01)  (0.029)  (0.011)  (0.027) 
T97  PROTECT x  - -0.38**  - -0.32** 
DISTANCE96  (0.05)  (0.049) 
R2  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02 
Notes: 
'Distance to  the  frontier firm'  is  defined as  follows,  DISTANCE.. =  tfPi  in 1996, 
If  maxtfp . 
.I 
implying that for a DISTANCE equal to  1, an individual firm i is  equally productive as the 
frontier firm in sector j, and with a Distance of 0 implying that a firm is very far below the 
frontier firm in terms of  efficiency. 
Column (1) and (2) use terminations as a control group in DO, columns (3) and (4) use the 
random counterfactual as control group. 
33 Figure 1:  Optimal Timing for Restructuring (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995) 
k(t) 
t* 
34 Figure 2 
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36 APPENDIX 
AI  Construction of  the data set 
We took great care  in  identifying as  closely as  possible  the  import-competing  EU 
firms  producing a  similar product to  the  one  subject to  AD  investigation.  The  'matching' 
between the 8 HS-digit product subject to AD-investigation that we obtained from the Official 
Journal, and the import-competing EU firms could not be done by using a general 'algorithm' 
for all cases involved, but required a specific approach in almost every case as documented in 
the AI. Some of the reasons for this  are  outlined here.  While each firm  in our commercial 
database AMADEUS has a 'trade description', that description is  often much wider than the 
product description mentioned in the AD-case. And while the AMADEUS-software allows a 
search of firms on the basis of this trade description, we were often unable to identify any EU 
firms producing the very specific product we were after. 
Therefore  in  most  cases,  a  different  approach  was  required.  The  Official  Journal 
usually,  though  not  always,  mentions  the  names  of the  EU  firms  that  initiated  the  AD-
complaint. In the 8 AD cases that we consider, at least one initiating firm was mentioned. On 
the basis of these company names we traced the initiating firms in AMADEUS and identified 
their 7 digit CSO activity code, the classification used in the AMADEUS company accounts 
dataset22.  Most initiators were  large firms  with more than one  7 digit activity code.  In that 
case we identified the 7-digit CSO code(s) that corresponded most closely to the AD-product 
in order to  consequently retrieve all EU firms in that same 7  -digit activity line. One problem 
with this approach was that 7  -digit CSO activity codes are only available for the medium and 
large  sized enterprises in our data,  but are  not reported for  the  small firms.  For the  small 
firms, AMADEUS only reports their activity at a higher level of aggregation, like the 4-digit 
NACE code or the 6 digit NAICS code. So, we only based our search strategy on the 7-digit 
CSO  code  when  despite  missing  out on all  the  small  firms,  a  sufficient number of firms 
producing the AD-product could be obtained.  In each case we  also  made sure that all the 
initiating fin11S  were included.  In cases where the search on the basis of 7  -digit CSO yielded 
too few EU firms  for meaningful analysis, we turned to the 6 digit NAICS activity codes of 
the initiating firms in order to identify the 6 digit NAICS code description best corresponding 
with the AD-product and then retrieved all EU firms in that NAICS category. By moving up 
one level of aggregation, we introduced somewhat more noise compared to the 7-digit CSO 
codes, but we gained many more observations because a search of EU firms on the basis of 
the 6 digit NAICS codes also included all the small firms. 
22  The CSO code is an activity code that is used by the British Statistical Office and defines the 
activities of firms at a 7  -digit level of  detail. 
37 And finally, when all other approaches were unsuccessful we turned to the NACE 4 
digit codes reported by the initiators and retrieved all firms in that NACE classification. 
Eventually a case-by-case decision based on common sense was necessary. In Table Ai 
below we provide an overview of the search strategy applied in each case. 
38 Table A1: Search Strategies for putting the Data together 
N arne of  the product  Search Strategy 
Cotton Fabrics  5 initiating firms for which the following CSO codes 
were found: 
4322007: Bunting, Cotton, Weaving 
4322019: Cotton Weaving 
4322028: Felt, Cotton, Weaving 
4322030: Flag, Cotton, Weaving 
4322034: Gaberdine, Cotton, Weaving 
4322073: Weaving Cotton and Man-Mad Fibres 
Synthetic Fibre Ropes  1 initiating firm identified, and the following CSO code 
found: 
4396000: Rope, Twine and Net. 
We also experimented with a second strategy, by taking 
the 6-digit NAICS code: Rope, Cordage and Twine 
Mills, the number of  firms remained the same, 
irrespective ofthe search strategy. We report the results 
based on the CSO codes. 
Luggage and Travel Goods  No initiating firms mentioned in the Official EU Journal 
We took the following 6-digit NAICS code: 
316991: Luggage Manufacturing 
Leather Handbags  2 initiating firms 
CSO code: 4410202: Fellmongery 
The CSO search strategy yielded too few EU firms for a 
sensible analysis, we therefore considered the 6-digit 
NAICS code: 
316992: Women's leather handbag and Purse 
Manufacturing 
Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes  8 initiating firms which yielded the following CSO 
codes: 
2220016: Tube Steel Manufacturing 
2220011: Seamless Tube Steel Manufacturing 
2220008: Pipe Steel Manufacturing 
Polyester Fibres Yarns  7 initiating firms yielding the following CSO activity 
codes: 
2600012: Synthetic Fibre Manufacturing 
2600011: Synthetic Man-Made Fibre Manufacturing 
2600008: Polyamide Man-Made Fibre Manufacturing 
2600009: Polyester Man-Made Fibre Manufacturing 
Video Tapes  No initiating firms, but took the following 7-digit CSO 
code: 
3452004: Video Ta~e Recording Manufacturing 
Stainless Steel Fasteners  5 initiating firms, but based on the 7  -digit CSO activity 
codes we ended up with a small number of  firms. We 
therefore took the 4-digit NACE code, which in fact 
corresponds closely to the product under investigation: 
2874: manufacturing of fasteners, screw machine 
products. 
39 BIOlley-Pakes (O-P) Methodology 
The idea behind the o-p estimation procedure is  that the unobservable productivity 
shock  Cil  can be  identified using  an  observable  investment  function,  it  = IJkp  mJ  that  is 
monotonically increasing in Cil  and the state variable k.  By inverting the investment function 
an expression for productivity can be written as  an unknown function h of investment and 
capital (Cilit=ht(iit ,kit)).23 As a result the productivity term in (21) can be substituted out or 
Y  it  = Pilit + ¢Jiit' kit) + 'lit 
and 
The above expression can be estimated semi-parametrically to obtain a consistent estimate of 
the coefficient on labo?4. 
In the second step of the procedure, information is used on firm dynamics to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the capital coefficient. In particular, it is  assumed that productivity Cil, 
follows a first order Markov process g, i.e.  mt+1  = E(mt+l\mt) + ;t+1  where SHI represents the 
news in the process and is  assumed to be uncorrelated with the productivity shock and with 
the capital input at t+ 1 (kHI)'  Capital used in any given period t+  1,  is  assumed to be known 
and fixed at the beginning of that period. News arriving at t+ 1 is  therefore is  uncorrelated 
with  capital  E(;k) = 0). However,  the  news  is  not uncorrelated  with the  variable  input 
(labor). For this reason the labor input is subtracted from the production and we consider the 
expectation of E( Yt+1  - fJJt+l)  conditional on the survival of the firm. A firm's probability of 
survival Pt  (with  ~  = Pr{Xt+1  = 1 }) into the next period depends on whether its efficiency 
level exceeds a critical productivity level (XHI=l  if CilHI  >  m  and 0 if otherwise). All this 
-t+1 
results in the following expression 
E[Yt+,  - PJt+l\kt+ " Xt+1  = 1] = fJo  + Pkkit+1  + E[mt+l\mt' Xt+1  = 1] 
= fJkkit+ 1  + g(mt+"mt) 
Using the above and using the law of  motion for the productivity shocks, we get 
23  Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest a modification of the Olley-Pakes (1996)  approach by using 
intermediate inputs, such as electricity or fuel usage instead of investment to identify the unobservable 
productivity shock.  In our data, however, we  have no  information on electricity or fuel usage so  we 
could not pursue this correction method. 
24 We proxy ¢t (iit, kit) with a 5th order polynomial in investment and capital and included time 
dummies to control for aggregate shocks in investment. 
40 Yif+l  - flliil+l = flo + flkkif+l + E(OJif+IIOJif' Xf+l  =  1) +  ~if+l + lJif+l 
=flkkif+l +g(OJif+I,OJif)+~il+l +lJif+l 
= flkkif+ 1 +  g(~,  ¢f  - fJkkif ) +  ~if+l + lJif+l 
The final step in the Olley and Pakes correction method, is  to  arrive at a consistent 
estimate of the capital coefficient. We get the coefficient on capital by minimizing the sum of 
squares of the residuals in the equation below,  thereby taking the first stage estimates of ~l 
and <PI  and the estimated probability of survival PI  and substituting them for the true values. 
s-m  s 
Yf+l  - PJf+l  = C + flkkf+l + L  Lflmj  (¢f  - flkkf)m ~j + ef+ 1 
j=O  m=O 
where s denotes the order of the polynomial used to estimate the coefficient on capital. We 
experimented with this  order of the polynomials used and we  find  that  there  is  almost no 
change  when  moving  from  the  4th  to  the  5th  order  polynomial.  We  use  bootstrapping 
methods to  come up with the  correct standard errors  for  the  series estimator of the capital 
coefficient. 
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